UNOBSERVABLES: WHY BOTHER?

Grudeva Elena Aleksandrovna

Abstract


This paper discusses the role of unobservable entities in scientific theories. The science used as example is linguistics. It is not one of the hard sciences and those in them may state that the problem of unobservables does not affect it. I think, however, that the use of linguistics is justified as there are fields in it that are natural sciences or at least closely approach them. I begin by discussing the positivists’ strict distinction between theory and observation and what happens if a theory never goes beyond observation terms and generalizations over them. Then I turn to difficulties raised by this theory/observation distinction. It turns out that a) unobservables are necessary for construction of possible worlds that generate explanations and predictions, b) the distinction between observables and unobservables should be made. I adhere to M W Wartofsky’s and R.Torretti’s view of this distinction with the idea of possible worlds added. The paper ends with an appendix on the generative syntax entity PRO used as example in illustrating the adopted point of view.


Keywords


observables; unobservables; entity; generative grammar; “surface grammar”; PRO.

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References


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